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1 Introduction
As the size and complexity of safety critical real-time system are rapidly in-
creasing due to the evolution of functional and non-functional requirements,
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) has become a promising means to improve the
reliability and efficiency of the traditional software engineering by introducing
the models and the formal methods. We use the multi V-model proposed in the
ITEA TIMMO project in Fig. 1 to illustrate the use of process of MDE for developing
real-time system. In order to generate reliable execution code, the verification
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Figure 1. V-Model in Model-Driven Engineering
and validation (V&V) are performed on each phase of system development life-
cycle. The architecture design is the phase to design hardware and software
architecture which can also be referred to as high-level design. It should involve
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a brief and abstract functionality of each module, their interface relationships,
dependability, architecture diagrams, etc. The detailed design model can also be
called modular or function design model, where the low-level design including
detailed functional logic of the module can be specified. From the current prac-
tice, the architecture is usually modeled using Domain Specific Language (DSL)
such as AADL and EAST-ADL or specific diagrams in a General Purpose Language
(GPL) such as UML (Composite Structure Diagram), while the detailed design is
usually modeled using DSL such as Simulink and SCADE or specific diagrams
such as UML Activity, State Machine Diagrams, or ALF (Action Language for
Foundational UML).
In practice, V&V in MDE is usually implemented in two manners: simulation and
formal verification (such as static analysis, theorem proving and model checking).
When a requirement is not satisfied, the verification results will be used to
diagnose this failed design. The end users will analyze the verification results
to locate the origin of fault ( an activity called fault localization). The efficient
and effective failure analysis method in V&V is an important issue.
Fault localization is not trivial in MDE. In the architecture design V&V, due
to the use of abstraction for scalable model checking, some unnecessary infor-
mation are removed for some specific V&V purpose. This reduces the state space
explosion problem, but usually leads to model with concurrent and indetermin-
istic behaviors that are much more complicated to debug. In the detailed design
V&V, fault propagation is one of main issues. When a functional constraint is
violated, we detect wrong output values from some components. Usually the
others’ outputs will be affected due to failure propagation.
In order to locate the potential origin of faults from failure scenario in the
model V&V, we propose to analyze fault locations using probabilistic approaches
inspired by data mining technologies. Considering the different features of ar-
chitecture design and detailed design, we use Kullback-Leibler Divergence
to analyze the failure from exhaustive model checking results in the architecture
design V&V, and use hidden markov model to analyze the failure from simulation
in the detailed design V&V. This paper describes early experiments on these two
aspects.
2 Probabilistic Failure Analysis in Model Checking
2.1 Problem Statements
Generating a counterexample in case a formula is violated is a key service pro-
vided by model checkers. Counterexamples produced by model checkers often
stand for error traces, which represent sequences of system states and transi-
tions and are therefore usually lengthy and difficult to understand. The origin
of error might be anywhere along these traces, thus requiring a lengthy analysis
by designers. Our ultimate goal is to detect and to provide the end users with
the suspicious ranked faulty elements.
Abstraction Issue Fault localization in model checking is challenging as the
models have usually a concurrent and indeterministic behavior with many possi-
ble execution traces. This behavior is due to the use of abstraction in their design.
Without precise information, fault localization may not be precise enough. Given
a sequential, or synchronized concurrent, program which exhibits less execution
traces, various debugging methods are available to detect and locate the faulty
statements. In model-based diagnosis, the use of abstraction is mandatory to
reduce the state space explosion problem. At the time of writing, the conflict
between model precision and verification cost is a key issue in model checking
and model-driven engineering (MDE), therefore a compromise is made to remove
the unnecessary information for some verification purpose while keeping all the
property-related information. This usually leads to model with concurrent and
indeterministic behaviors that exhibits a much larger number of execution traces
and are consequently much more complicated to debug.
Fault Localization Issue Sometimes it is difficult, even for seasoned experts,
to analyze the fault origin. We take a simple example (see Ex. 1) to illustrate
this issue.
Example 1 (Fault Localization Example). Assume a system consists of two con-
current processes A and B. Both execute only once. The execution time is [5,10]
for A, and [3,7] for B. The expected temporal property P is Always A After
B.
It is obvious that P is unsatisfied. The design fault occurs either on A or on B.
To remove this violation, we can either replace the time constraint of A by [8,10],
or replace the time constraint of B by [3,4]. However, without extra information,
A and B exhibit the same suspicion. If an extra information is available, e.g. the
best case execution time (BCET) of B is 5, then the time constraint of B cannot
anymore be replaced by [3,4], thus the suspicion of B is largely decreased.
This example is simple enough to be analyzed manually, while it is impossible
for more complex system with thousands of transitions. Any modification on a
transition may impact the verification result through time constraint propaga-
tion.
Proposed Approach Existing automated fault localization techniques in model
checking usually produce a set of suspicious statements without any particular
ranking [3,17,16,4,20]. Our approach will improve the effectiveness of fault local-
ization by providing a suspiciousness factor which is used to rank the suspicious
transitions in the verification model [14]. The suspiciousness factor is computed
using the fault contribution of each transition on the error traces derived from
the reachability graph. This approach has been applied in our formal verifi-
cation framework of UML-MARTE designs dedicated to the real-time properties
[10,12,13,11,15].
2.2 Preliminaries
Reachability Graph & Violation States Reachability graphs are used to
solve reachability problem in model checking. They contain all the states in the
execution of a system and all the transitions between these states. When a safety
property is not satisfied, there exists violation states in the reachability graph.
Finding all violation states in the reachability graph is the first step of error
localization.
Fault Contribution of Transition
Definition 1 (Fault Contribution). Fault Contribution (CF ) is a suspicious-
ness factor to evaluate a transition’s suspicion level. It is used to rank the sus-
piciousness of transitions.
Error Traces
Definition 2 (Error Trace). For all the states {si} on the path from an ini-
tial state s0 to a violation state sv in the reachability graph, all the outgoing
transitions of si are considered as error trace pi.
We consider not only the transitions on the path that leads S0 to Sv in the
definition of error trace but also the direct outgoing transitions of all the states
in execution traces that lead to correct states. Indeed, in TPN, the transitions
outgoing from the same place can mutually influence each other. A faulty tran-
sition can change the way a correct transition is fired if they are both outgoings
from the same place. The correct transition will diminish the CF of the faulty
transition.
Example 2 (Error Trace Example). In Fig. 2, s0 is initial state, sv is a violation
state. On the execution trace from s0 to sv, there exist four states {s0, s1, s2, s3}
(apart from sv). The state s3 is in a correct trace. When the system is in state
s2, it is possible to transit to s7 leading to a correct trace, or to s3 leading
to a violation state. If s7 is removed from the graph, s3 will have higher fault
contribution for the violation state. The outgoing transitions of these four states
are considered as error traces pi, i.e., pi = {t0, t1, t2, t1, t5, t4, t2, t3, t4}.
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Figure 2. Error Trace Example
2.3 Kullback-Lerbler Divergence
Kullback-Leibler Divergence (also called information divergence, informa-
tion gain, relative entropy) [21] is a fundamental equation of information theory
that qualifies the proximity of two probability distributions.
Definition 3 (Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KL)). KL Divergence is a mea-
sure in statistics that quantifies in bits how close a probability distribution
P = {pi} is to a model (or candidate) distribution Q = {qi}. The KL-divergence
of Q from P over a discrete random variable is defined as
DKL(P ‖ Q) =
∑
i
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
(1)
Note: In the definition above, 0 ln 00 = 0, 0 ln
0
q = 0, and p ln
p
0 =∞.
Kullback-Leibler Divergence has many applications. We give an example
of its application to text classification [2]. A textual document d is a discrete
distribution of |d| random variables, where |d| is the number of terms in the
document. Let d1 and d2 be two documents whose similarity we want to compute.
This is done using DKL(d1 ‖ d2) and DKL(d2 ‖ d1).
Another major application is the TF-IDF (Term Frequency - Inverse Docu-
ment Frequency) algorithm [19]. TF-IDF is a numerical statistic which reflects
how important a term is for a given document in a corpus (collection) of doc-
uments. It is often used as a weighting factor in information retrieval and text
mining. Variations of the TF-IDF weighting scheme are often used by search en-
gines as a central tool in scoring and ranking a document’s relevance to a given
user query.
Suppose we have a collection of English textual documents and aim to de-
termine which documents are most relevant to the query ”the model checking”.
We might start by eliminating documents that do not contain the three words
”the”, ”model”, and ”checking”, but this still leaves many documents. To further
distinguish them, we might count the number of times each term occurs in each
document and sum them all together; the number of times a term occurs in a
document is called its term frequency (TF).
However, because the term ”the” is so common, this might incorrectly empha-
size documents which happen to use the word ”the” more frequently, without
giving enough weight to the more meaningful terms ”model” and ”checking”.
The term ”the” is not a good keyword to distinguish relevant and non-relevant
documents and terms, unlike the less common words ”model” and ”checking”.
Hence an inverse document frequency (IDF) factor is incorporated which dimin-
ishes the weight of terms that occur very frequently in the document set and
increases the weight of terms that occur rarely.
2.4 Ranking Suspicious Faulty Transitions
Inspired by the TF-IDF algorithm, we propose a probabilistic fault localization ap-
proach based on the Kullback-Leibler Divergence. A relevance weight CF (t)
is computed to assess the contribution of a transition t in error traces leading to
violation states and thus its contribution to the fault.
In the TF-IDF algorithm, each term in the documents will contribute to the
semantics of keywords. Some terms are considered as significant if they are more
relevant to the semantics of keywords. This is similar to the fault contribution
caused by a given transition in an error trace in model checking. Fig. 3 com-
pares the similarity between semantic contribution of terms in documents and
fault contribution of transitions in error traces. Some terms in documents have
closer semantic relation to the keywords, the occurrence of these terms provide
more semantic contributions to the occurrence of keywords. Similarly, the fault
propagation depends on the topology of error traces, the occurrence of some
transitions will provide more fault contributions to the occurrence of violation
states.
Documents
Error Traces Violation States
Keyword SemanticsTerms
Transitions
Semantic 
Contribution
Fault 
Contribution
Figure 3. Comparison to TF-IDF
The semantic contribution of a term in documents is measured by TF-IDF,
where TF is the contribution of a term in single document, and IDF is the con-
tribution of a term in a collection of documents. The fault contribution to the
violation states {svi} caused by a transition t on error traces {pii} can also be
evaluated by a similar measure CF (t), defined as TC-ITC (Transition Contribu-
tion - Inverse Trace Contribution). CF (t) = TC(t) · ITC(t).
2.5 Experimental Results
We assess our approach using two significant criteria: effectiveness and efficiency.
According to the survey [25], the effectiveness can be assessed by a score EXAM
in terms of the percentage of statements that have to be examined until the
first statement containing the fault is reached [6,26]. The fault localization tech-
niques in model checking, like other techniques, should terminate in a timely
manner, limited by some resource constraints. The efficiency can be assessed by
the scalability and the performance.
Automated Test Bed The test bed will generate randomly systems which
might have deadlock, then apply the proposed analysis algorithm and check that
it detects the introduced deadlocks. We use Time Petri Net to model system’s
behavior.
For a given TPN system S(P,R,M), P are the processes which run infinitely
and need a resource before the next task (a task is represented by a transition);
R are resource which are shared by all the processes, but only accessible in an
exclusive way; M is a matrix to decide whether process Pi will need to access
resource Rj . Coffman identified four conditions that must hold simultaneously
in order to have a deadlock [5]. To improve the success of creating a deadlock in
the system, we introduced another mechanism to enforce deadlocks: randomly
let some processes during some tasks forget to release a used resource. These
tasks are then considered as the error source of system’s deadlock.
Evaluation of Efficiency We have generated thousands of test cases by as-
signing P and R values from 5 to 20, creating 1 to 9 faulty transitions, with all
the other parameters totally random. The tests are performed on a 2,4 GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo processor running Mac OS X 10.6.8. The system parameters and
efficiency evaluation results are shown in Table 1. The average time of evaluation
shows that the approach is efficient for large scale system.
Table 1. Efficiency Evaluation
System Evaluation
Fault Num. Test Num. Av. State/Transition Average Time (s)
1 400 4949 / 15440 2.9092
2 517 2428 / 7130 1.1244
3 500 9884 / 31237 3.3533
4 402 8811 / 26663 2.5998
5 303 6756 / 18247 1.2196
6 504 27094 / 75808 5.064
7 757 104857 / 304741 15.0072
8 100 112306 / 283004 15.0289
9 1 241920 / 583200 36.906
Evaluation of Effectiveness The effectiveness evaluation is shown in Table 2.
We give out EXAM score, EXAM score variance, rank, and rank variance for the best
cases and worst cases, and then show the average EXAM score and average rank.
The EXAM score varies from 2% to 13% for best cases, and varies from 4% to 18%
for worst cases. In average, EXAM varies from 3% to 16% which corresponds to
ranking results from 1 to 8. The stability is represented by the variance result.
These experimental results shows our approach is effective.
3 Probabilistic Failure Analysis in Simulation
3.1 Background
Fault localization algorithms usually follow two paradigms: cause-effect and
effect-cause analyses. Cause-effect analysis [24,27,18] starts from possible causes
Table 2. Effectiveness Evaluation
F. N.
Best Case Worst Case Average
EXAM EXAM Var Rank Rank Var EXAM EXAM Var Rank Rank Var EXAM Rank
1 0,13335 0,00134 3,25 1,79 0,18603 0,00244 4,33 1,63 0,15969 3,79
2 0,04229 0,00219 1,1 1,75 0,09574 0,00213 2,11 1,75 0,069015 1,605
3 0,02108 0,00106 0,75 1,52 0,05892 0,0009 1,75 1,52 0,04 1,25
4 0,00722 0,0004 0,26 0,49 0,039 0,00042 1,26 0,49 0,02311 0,76
5 0,02044 0,0017 0,83 2,95 0,0478 0,00162 1,83 2,95 0,03412 1,33
6 0,05369 0,00336 2,46 7,36 0,0766 0,0033 3,46 7,36 0,065145 2,96
7 0,08857 0,00372 4,61 10,9 0,10822 0,0037 5,61 10,9 0,098395 5,11
8 0,13091 0,00099 7,3 3,95 0,14905 0,001 8,3 3,95 0,13998 7,8
9 0,10169 0 6 0 0,11864 0 7 0 0,110165 6,5
(fault models). A simulator is used to predict system’s behavior in the pres-
ence of various faults. Then predictions are matched against observed behavior.
Effect-cause analysis [1,23] reasons faulty localization based on observed behav-
ior and expected good functions. It back-traces faulty causes from the identified
suspect components.
In this work, we make a trade-off of cause-effect and effect-cause analyses and
propose an Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [22] based approach for the automated
localization of faulty components in the simulation [8,7,9]. The component can
be hardware device, software modules or functional blocks in the system. This
method combines forward localization analysis and backward confidence degree
evaluation. HMM, as a component’s abstraction, provides statistically identical
information to component’s real behavior. The core of this method is a fault lo-
calization algorithm that gives out the set of suspicious ranked faulty components
and a backward algorithm that computes the matching degree between the HMM
and the simulation model to evaluate the confidence degree of the localization
conclusion.
3.2 HMM Modeling and Analysis
An HMM is defined as a statistical model used to represent stochastic processes,
where the states are not directly observed. A basic HMM can be described as
follows:
– N: number of states
– M: number of observations
– MI: initial probability distribution;
N∑
i=1
MI(i) = 1
– MT: probability distribution of transitions from states to states;
N∑
j=1
MT(i, j) = 1, i = 1...N
– ME: emission distribution for the observations associated with states;
M∑
j=1
ME(i, j) = 1, i = 1...N
Example 3 (HMM Example). A two states HMM example abstracting a system’s
health condition is given by Fig. 4, where the system owns two states Healthy
(H) and Faulty (F), and two observations which represent the ouputs respect the
functional constraints (R) or violate the functional constraints (V). The three
distributions MIMTME are:
(
0.6 0.4
)(0.7 0.3
0.4 0.6
)(
0.9 0.1
0.2 0.8
)
.
Healthy Faulty
Output
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Output 
R
Init
0.6 0.4
0.60.7 0.3
0.4
0.9 0.1 0.2 0.8
Figure 4. A Two States Hidden Markov Model
HMM, as abstract model of real system, is statistically identical to system’s
real behavior. When modeling a system, HMM separates the concept into two
conceptually independent paradigms: behavior and observation. Behavior refers
to what the system really is; while observation to what the system exhibits that is
used for its recognition. MI gives indication about the probability that a behavior
becomes the first behavior when system runs. MT decides how probably will the
system behave from one state to the other states. This is statistically equivalent
to the real system’s behavior. ME provides a distribution that connects the
behavior and the observation: if at a given time the behavior is known, how
probably an observed sequence will occur.
MI,MT and ME can be obtained by modeling or through a learning process.
Once all these matrix parameters are estimated, HMM is capable to deduce, given
an observed output sequence or a set of such sequences, the maximum likelihood
estimation of inner-state transition sequences.
3.3 Automated Fault Localization Based on Hidden Markov Model
This approach is based on component analysis. Each component is mapped to
an HMM. If all the input/output pair of a component can be exhaustively listed,
we can get an exact distribution of how this component respects the functional
constraints. This approach can be explained by using Fig. 5. An HMM, as a com-
ponent’s abstraction, provides statistically similar information to simulation by
MI. That is equally saying, a component can be simulated by HMM if we can be
sure they behave statistically in the same way. To measure whether they be-
have the same, we introduce an evaluation approach by using test results. The
returned evaluation metrics are used to revise or refine the parameters in HMM,
until it approximates the component’s real behavior.
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Figure 5. HMM Fault Localization Framework
System States A component C is mapped to an HMM. Hmm’s states are the
combination of component’s faulty status and its inputs faulty status. System’s
behavior is modeled by 4 states:
– PIp: C is not faulty, C’s inputs are passed
– PIf : C is not faulty, C’s inputs are failed
– FIp: C is faulty, C’s inputs are passed
– FIf : C is faulty, C’s inputs are failed
Observation & Observed Sequence The observation is defined by the test
results of component’s outputs. There are only 2 observations:
– Op: outputs are passed
– Of : outputs are failed
The dependency between components is built By defining HMM states and
observations in this way. For component C, its output observation is the input
(contained in the defined states) of the successor.
Initial Probability Matrix MI Assume components’ faulty probability is ω,
MI is defined as following table 3. If ω is not available, we assume each state
has identical initial faulty probability, i.e. ω = 12 .
Table 3. Initial Probability MatrixMI
PIp PIf FIp FIf
Init 1−ω
2
1−ω
2
ω
2
ω
2
Table 4. Transition Probability Ma-
trix MT
PIp PIf FIp FIf
PIp
α(1−ω)
α+β
β(1−ω)
α+β
αω
α+β
βω
α+β
PIf
γ(1−ω)
γ+δ
δ(1−ω)
γ+δ
γω
γ+δ
δω
γ+δ
FIp
α(1−ω)
α+β
β(1−ω)
α+β
αω
α+β
βω
α+β
FIf
γ(1−ω)
γ+δ
δ(1−ω)
γ+δ
γω
γ+δ
δω
γ+δ
Transition Probability Matrix MT MT contains statistical values derived
from test results. If n test cases are observed, a component with m inputs corre-
sponds to m·n input sequences. Using the m·n input sequences, we can compute
the fault probabilities α, β, γ, δ respectively for the transitions the states, where
α+β+γ+δ = 1. MT is then calculated as following table 4. If ω is not available,
we assume ω = 1.
Emission Probability Matrix ME The key of this approach is evaluating
ME . According to previous analysis, we need to measure how well an HMM sta-
tistically simulates a given component, which is represented by Matching Level.
Definition 4 (Matching Level (µ)). Matching level evaluates how well HMM
simulates a component’s real behavior.
The objective is to find an HMM with the highest matching level. This turns
the problem to be an optimization problem, and many techniques can be ap-
plied, e.g. exhaustive search by minimum internal, heuristic algorithm, evolution
algorithm, experimental design, etc. In this work, the matching level is derived
by calculating the probability that a component’s outputs pass the tests through
HMM observations. However, this matching level is a local value relative to one
component, making it have no meaning to compare with others. Therefore, the
forward search only is not enough to guarantee the matching level. We introduce
the concept of Confidence Level to evaluate the global confidence of matching
level.
Definition 5 (Confidence Level (ρ)). Confidence level evaluates the confi-
dence of the matching level.
We propose the following algorithm to evaluate the ME in HMM (h) corre-
sponding to component C. Tm,n = {τ1, τ2, ..., τn}m are test cases results for
m outputs of C. The threshold of matching level µ and confidence level ρ are
pre-defined.
3.4 Estimating System’s Behavior & Locating Fault
When the HMM with high matching level and high confidence level is confirmed,
we can estimate the component’s status. Using the states calculated from the
Figure 6. Algorithm: evaluation of ME
function Get Behaviour States(h, Tm,n), e.g. a states behavior sequence is de-
rived, an example of which is given (FIp, FIp, PIf, FIp, ...FIf, FIp, ...).
In the states behavior sequence, we focus on the status of component, shown
as follow: (F, F, P, F..., F, F, ...). The status with higher occurrence probability is
confirmed as this component’s faulty status.
This result’s confidence is guaranteed by the confidence level (ρ), and the
HMM’s similarity to the component is guaranteed by the matching level (µ). ρ and
µ are computed within system’s topological structure, therefore we can compare
all the faulty component’s ρ and µ, and give a set of suspect faulty components
ordered by ρ and µ.
3.5 Experimental Results
We design a specific test bed to assess the method’s accuracy and efficiency
by generating a large number of use cases. Each use case includes: the system
architecture which defines the components and the ports, and their intercon-
nections; the failure probability of each component; the functional specifi-
cation corresponding to the inputs/outputs.
The method assumes that each component in the system has a chance to fail
if it has design problems. This probability will be 0 if no design fault is presumed
for this component. All functional constraints are based on input/output’s value
itself, and for simplification, they are all range constraint, which means they de-
limit only the min/max value of the input/output. If a faulty component exists,
the test bed will by chance give out an out-of-range value for this component’s
output. This emulates how a system fails, whatever the model is. Each com-
ponent’s input and output will be allocated to a variable by the test bed. It
guarantees that the interconnected ones share the same variable. The variable
will be associated with a random range, which is the functional specification. If a
device is more probable to fail, the test-bed-generated value for its entire output
variables will be more probable to go out of the defined range. The approach will
use the generated data and the functional specification to automatically locate
the faulty component. The test bed will then compare this computed conclusion
with the initial context to deduce whether the method is efficient.
The test bed generated 1000 use cases to assess the performance in terms of
accuracy. The criteria that impacts the accuracy is the complexity of system’s
architecture. This can be measured by component number (Fig. 7). and compo-
nent’s average input & output number (Fig. 8). We find out that this method
is more sensible to the average input & output number, while it is more scal-
able to component number. This method deals with the fault localization for
middle-range systems with a accuracy superior to 90%.
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Figure 7. Accuracy by Component Number
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Figure 8. Accuracy by Input number
The computation of ME parameters by iteratively searching algorithm con-
sumes time, which is bounded by the iteration limit. This Monte-Carlo algorithm
runs from several seconds to several minutes. However, as the computation of
each component is independent, the whole method is linearly scalable. For a large
system, a parallel cluster will locate the probable design faults within minutes.
4 Conclusion
Automated fault localization is an important issue in model V&V. It helps the
end users in analyzing the origin of failure. In this work, we have shown the early
experiments with probabilistic analysis approaches in fault localization. Inspired
by the Kullback-Leibler Divergence from Bayesian probabilistic theory, we
propose a suspiciousness factor to compute the fault contribution for the transi-
tions in the reachability graph of model checking. The potential faulty transitions
are then ranked according to this suspiciousness factor. To automatically locate
design faults in the simulation model of detailed design, we propose to use the
statistical model Hidden Markov Model (HMM). HMM, as a component’s abstrac-
tion, provides statistically identical information to component’s real behavior.
The core of this method is a fault localization algorithm that gives out the set of
suspicious ranked faulty components and a backward algorithm that computes
the matching degree between the HMM and the simulation model to evaluate the
confidence degree of the localization conclusion.
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